



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
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# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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Belgium-Congo: [Several high officials of key Belgian companies in the Congo have expressed concern about the future of the Tshombé government and the Congo]

Union Miniere Director Van Weyenbergh--whose perspective may be distorted by the importance of the Belgian copper enterprise in Katanga--told the US consul in Elisabethville on 15 July he did not think Tshombé would make sufficient headway against external and internal opposition. He said he was disappointed with the narrow base of Tshombé's government and feared he might go down, thus opening the way to increased Communist influence in the Congo.

Commenting on charges that Tshombé is a creature of Union Miniere, Van Weyenbergh said he wished it were true, but that the only thing the company expects from Tshombé is a bigger tax squeeze.

[In Brussels, the president of the Companie du Kasai and a director of numerous Congo companies have both told a US Embassy official that neither the holding company Societé Generale nor any of its components played a role in bringing Tshombé back. According to them, the Societé Generale has a very low opinion of Tshombé's government.]

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USSR: Khrushchev may use his visit to Warsaw on 22 July for the 20th anniversary of Poland's liberation to announce the withdrawal of some Soviet troops from East Germany.

He probably would couple this with an appeal for further reductions of all foreign forces in Germany as a means of carrying forward the "policy of mutual example."

Khrushchev may also believe the Warsaw ceremonies will provide a good forum for pressing the recent Soviet theme that West Germany and the three Western powers are still bound, by obligations arising from Hitler's unconditional surrender and the Potsdam Agreement, to uproot German "militarism" and to prevent German "aggression." He may elaborate on vague proposals put forward during Ulbricht's visit to the USSR last month for reducing West Germany's armed forces and for establishing international control over its military production.

The Soviet premier may feel the time is ripe to restate or modify Soviet positions on European security questions such as a nuclear-free zone in Central Europe, a nonaggression pact, and a treaty banning the dissemination of nuclear weapons. Moscow's 11 July notes, which renewed the attack on the Multilateral Nuclear Force (MLF) project, reaffirmed Soviet support for "collective measures against the dissemination of nuclear weapons."

Pronouncements along these lines probably would be aimed primarily at stimulating further resistance to the MLF in Western countries and at giving an impression of movement in the USSR's German and European policies.

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Italy: Although premier-designate Aldo Moro appears to have been given the green light to form a new cabinet, prospects are not bright for any government that he succeeds in installing.

[The protracted nature of the negotiations between the four participating parties suggests they reached an agreement largely because there was no viable alternative to the center-left formula. A number of observers have predicted a short life for the new government and believe it likely to resign after the Christian Democratic national congress, which now may be held late in September.]

The allocation of cabinet posts may require several days to resolve, and even after parliamentary approval Moro will face further difficulties from the center and right of his own party and the Socialist left wing. The compromises apparently reached on the issues of state aid to private schools and extension of the center-left formula to local administrations may prove temporary. There will be recurring attacks from those who, for varying reasons, are opposed to the approach that the government is taking to stabilize the economy.

The spread of labor unrest will make Moro's task more difficult once his government has been installed. The pilots' strike which has grounded the Italian airlines and the threatened series of consecutive two-hour walkouts in the railroads are likely to be followed by agitation in other sectors. The Communists will continue to seize every opportunity through their domination of the General Labor Confederation to obstruct the government's economic program and particularly to discredit their former allies, the Socialists, by provoking demands for tough counteraction from conservative elements within and outside the government.

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India: The appointment of Swaran Singh to the Foreign Ministry, announced on 18 July, appears intended to demonstrate continuity in Indian foreign policy.

Shastri probably feels he can depend on Singh to carry out his wishes in administering India's foreign affairs. Singh, a Sikh, has established his credentials as an experienced, competent administrator, loyal to his prime minister. The appointment will cause no apprehensions that any significant changes are contemplated in India's basic foreign policies.

Shastri still hopes to improve relations with Pakistan, despite border clashes and recent strains on the propaganda moratorium. His choice may have been influenced by the fact that Singh is especially well informed on relations with Pakistan. The new foreign minister has represented India in negotiations with Pakistan on several occasions, most recently in the series of talks on Kashmir during the winter of 1963.

The appointment of Singh, who is not a controversial figure in Indian domestic politics, will arouse fewer jealousies among cliques within and outside the cabinet than several of the candidates who have been more prominently mentioned for the Foreign Ministry. His Industry and Supply portfolio has been filled by minor reshuffling.

Shastri's decision at this time to give up the foreign affairs portfolio, which, like Nehru, he has held since becoming prime minister, is in response to his doctor's insistence that he must cut down his former heavy schedule of duties.

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Jordan: The scheduled dismissal by King Husayn of almost 100 army officers whom he considers incompetent, mostly Bedouins whose tribes have long been pillars of support for the monarchy, has antagonized tribal leaders and may have undermined their loyalty to the King. The projected dismissals and other transfers prompted army commander in chief Majali and certain other Bedouin officers to submit their resignations last week, but the King has rejected them. Husayn's action is part of his plans for reorganizing and enlarging the army and is related to the arms requests which will be made in Washington on 21 July by a Jordanian purchasing mission.

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Venezuela: Terrorism, relatively dormant since the failure of the pro-Castro terrorists to force cancellation of the presidential election last December, appears to be on the upsurge again. Since 10 July, four policemen and one civilian have been killed in street shootings, and several other incidents have been reported in the state of Miranda. Some of these terrorist attacks may be in retaliation for current army operation against guerrillas in Miranda.

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The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

The Scientific Adviser to the President

The Director of the Budget

The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council

The Director of Intelligence and Research

The Treasury Department

The Secretary of the Treasury

The Under Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of Defense

The Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

The Secretary of the Army

The Secretary of the Navy

The Secretary of the Air Force

The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)

The Assistant Secretary of Defense

The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff

Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy

Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

Chief of Staff, United States Army

Commandant, United States Marine Corps

U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Commander in Chief, Pacific

Commander in Chief, Atlantic

The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

The Director, The Joint Staff

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army

The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy

The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

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